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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The responsibility to protect has stalled as an influential force in the 
world. The responsibility to protect, commonly abbreviated as R2P, is a 
legal concept intended to prevent gross human rights atrocities. The concept 
rests on two core premises. First, that sovereign states have an inherent 
responsibility to protect their people. Second, that if a state is unwilling or 
unable to fulfill this responsibility, the international community of states has 
a duty to take on that individual state’s responsibility when a population is 
suffering serious harm.1 Debate focused on the scope of states’ duties and their 
ability to intervene militarily under the responsibility to protect has made the 
concept ineffective at preventing or responding to serious human rights crises. 
To realize the R2P’s goal of atrocity prevention, proponents must redirect this 
discourse and the development of the concept from focusing on military in-
tervention to focusing on conflict prevention.  
 Part I of this Note tracks the rise and fall of the responsibility to protect 
concept since it was first introduced in 2001. Part II considers how the R2P 
concept and debate surrounding its development have evolved. Part III ana-
lyzes strategies for both reviving and improving the concept as it currently 
stands. This Note concludes that though the development of the responsibility 
to protect concept has slowed in international law, its proponents can revive 
the responsibility to protect concept and better achieve its goal of atrocity pre-
vention by redirecting focus from the concept as a means of humanitarian in-
tervention to a legal concept with force for conflict prevention. 
II. RISE AND FALL OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT CONCEPT 
International actors including the United Nations, regional organizations, 
and individual states failed to prevent gross and systematic human rights vio-
lations throughout the 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans.  
 
A. 1990s Turmoil Gives Rise to Perceived Need to Move Beyond Doctrine 
of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
In 1999 international actors failed to stop “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo.2  
The U.N. Security Council failed to authorize coercive military action in Ko-
sovo before thousands were killed.3 Despite the absence of Security Council 
 
 1 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT IX (2001) [hereinafter THE REPORT]. 
 2 Flashback to Kosovo’s War, BBC (July, 10, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
5165042.stm. 
 3 Id. 
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authorization, NATO began intervening with air strikes in March 1999.4 After 
the air strikes, Sweden established the Independent International Commission 
on Kosovo to determine the legitimacy and legality of NATO’s intervention.5 
The Kosovo Commission found NATO’s actions were “legitimate, but not 
legal” and recognized “the need to close the gap” between the two issues of 
sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.6  
After the Kosovo Commission announced its findings, U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan challenged state leaders in the 2000 Millennium Report 
by asking: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault 
on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of 
our common humanity?”7 
 
B. Formulating the Responsibility to Protect Concept: 2001 Report of 
Commission 
 
To answer Annan’s challenge, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy established the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (“Commission”) in September 2000.8 The Commission’s man-
date was to promote debates and foster international political consensus on 
how to develop timely reactions to massive violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law in the international system.9 Further, the Commission was 
to “find new ways of reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable notions of in-
tervention and state sovereignty.”10 To carry out this mandate, the Canadian 
government invited twelve individuals to serve as Commissioners.11 The 
Commissioners came from around the world, representing a diverse range of 
regions, experiences, and viewpoints on the issues the Commission was man-
dated to address.12 
Between November 2000 and September 2001, the Commission held five 
meetings with all Commissioners present, as well as eleven regional 
roundtables and “national consultations.”13 National and regional officials and 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 Press Release, Press Briefing on the Kosovo Commission, U.N. Press Release (Oct. 
23, 2000); INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOS., THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES, LESSONS LEARNED 24–25 (2000). 
 6 INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOS., supra note 5, at 10, 289. 
 7 U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 
Twenty-First Century, ¶ 217, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000). 
 8 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at VII, XI. 
 9 Id. at 81. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 82–83. 
2020 REFOCUSING TO REVIVE 777 
representatives of civil society—from intergovernmental and nongovernmen-
tal organizations, academic institutions, and think-tanks—attended these 
roundtables and consultations.14 The Commission’s efforts culminated a re-
port titled Responsibility to Protect (“Report”), published December 2001.15 
The Commission answered its mandate on state sovereignty and humani-
tarian intervention by introducing the legal concept, the responsibility to pro-
tect. The responsibility to protect as a concept rests on two core premises: 
first, that sovereign states have an inherent responsibility to protect its people; 
and second, that if a state is unwilling or unable to fulfill this responsibility, 
the international community of states has a duty to take on the individual 
state’s responsibility when a population is suffering serious harm.16 In its Re-
port, the Commission stated that this responsibility to protect embraced three 
specific responsibilities: to prevent serious harm to populations, to react to 
situations of serious harm, and to rebuild after harm or intervention occurs in 
a specific state.17 
 
C. Refining the Responsibility to Protect Concept: 2005 Report of the U.N. 
Secretary-General and Endorsement of the World Summit Outcome 
 
In 2005, both the U.N. Secretary-General and the U.N. General Assembly 
endorsed the responsibility to protect concept.18 In March 2005, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan published a five-year progress report titled In Larger 
Freedom, which endorsed the concept and also set the agenda for the U.N. 
World Summit held later that September.19 In the report, Secretary-General 
Annan stated, “I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, 
and, when necessary, we must act on it.”20 In Paragraph 135, the report stated: 
This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individ-
ual State, whose primary raison d’être and duty is to protect its 
population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling 
 
 14 Id. at 83. 
 15 Id. at VIII. 
 16 Id. at XI. 
 17 Id. 
 18 U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005); G.A. Res. A/60/1, 
2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
 19 U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc A/59/2005 (March, 21 2005); see generally, In Larger 
Freedom Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Decision by Heads of 
State and Government in September 2005, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 10, 2019), http://www.un 
.org/en/events/pastevents/in_larger_freedom.shtml. 
 20 U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). 
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to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the in-
ternational community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being 
of civilian populations. When such methods appear insuffi-
cient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take 
action under the Charter of the United Nations, including en-
forcement action, if so required.21  
This understanding of the responsibility to protect was similar to the con-
cept as introduced by the Commission.22 
Six months later at the 2005 World Summit, the U.N. General As-
sembly also endorsed the responsibility to protect concept.23 More than 
170 Heads of State and Government gathered at the United Nations 
Headquarters in New York from September fourteenth to sixteenth for 
the World Summit, which served as the 60th session of the U.N. General 
Assembly.24 The World Summit agenda focused on areas of develop-
ment, security, human rights, and reform of the United Nations.25 The 
General Assembly adopted a resolution at the end of the three-day meet-
ing, which included the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.26 In 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Document, the General 
Assembly affirmed the responsibility to protect’s core premises: that in-
dividual states and the international community have a responsibility to 
protect populations from atrocities including genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.27 
 
 
 
 21 Id. 
 22 See generally Mindia Vashakmadze, Responsibility to Protect, in THE CHARTER OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY (3d ed.) (2012) (suggesting the Secretary-General’s 
report embraces the 2001 Report’s concept of responsibility to protect more than the High-
level Panel, which embraced responsibility to protect in the context of U.N. collective mil-
itary action). 
 23 G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 
2005). 
 24 The 2005 World Summit High-Level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the UN 
General Assembly (14–16 September 2005, UN Headquarters, New York), UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/worldsummit_2005.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2019). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id.; G.A. Res. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 138–139 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
 27 G.A. Res. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 138–139 (Sept. 16, 2005). Para-
graphs 138 and 139 are cited below in full. See infra notes 73 and 85, respectively. 
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i. Embracing and Backing Away from the Responsibility to Protect: 
The Concept Since 2005 
 
Though the responsibility to protect is not a rule of customary international 
law, the U.N. Human Rights Council, General Assembly, and Security Coun-
cil have collectively referenced the concept over 100 times since the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted the concept at the 2005 World Summit.28  While 
some U.N. resolutions have discussed thematic issues related to the responsi-
bility to protect concept, such as the protection of civilians or the prevention 
of genocide, others have addressed specific situations occurring around the 
world.29 The latter of these resolutions have addressed situations in Sudan, 
Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Central African Republic, 
Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, and Somalia.30 Most of 
these resolutions addressed the responsibility to protect by emphasizing indi-
vidual state responsibility to protect citizens or condemning state action, ra-
ther than authorizing international action against these states under the con-
cept.31 Libya—the only situation in which the U.N. Security Council 
explicitly employed responsibility to protect by authorizing full coercive ac-
tion—as well as Sudan, the Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Yemen, and Syria—has been a particularly divisive topic of the responsibility 
to protect debate.32 
 
 28 GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
A BACKGROUND BRIEFING (2017), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/t 
he-responsibility-to-protect-background-briefing.pdf (“As of September 2017 the respon-
sibility to protect has been invoked in 64 U.N. Security Council resolutions, 10 General 
Assembly resolutions, and 28 Human Rights Council resolutions.”). The Global Centre for 
the Responsibility to Protect is a nongovernmental organization that engages in advocacy, 
research and partnerships with other nongovernmental organizations, government, and re-
gional bodies with the mission of transforming the responsibility to protect “into a practical 
guide for action in the face of mass atrocities.” About Us, GLOB. CTR. FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.globalr2p.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2020). 
 29 GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 28; U.N. Security Coun-
cil Resolutions and Presidential Statements Referencing the Responsibility to Protect, 
GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/un 
-security-council-resolutions-and-presidential-statements-referencing-r2p/ (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Resolutions and Presidential Statements]; see also Responsibil-
ity to Protect Key Documents, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/genocidepreventio 
n/key-documents.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2020). 
 30 GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 28. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Because this Note does not attempt to analyze the proper use of military force through 
Responsibility to Protect References, the factual background on all situations which have 
been or are arguably ripe for military intervention under the responsibility to protect doc-
trine is cursory. See Jared Genser, The United Nations Security Council’s Implementation 
of the Responsibility to Protect: A Review of Past Interventions and Recommendations for 
Improvement, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 420 (2018) (providing detailed factual summaries and 
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ii. Embracing the Responsibility to Protect: 2005–2011 
 
The office of the U.N. Secretary-General has embraced and worked to 
develop the responsibility to protect concept since it was adopted by all Heads 
of State and Government at the World Summit in 2005.33 The Secretary-Gen-
eral appointed a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect in 2008 and 
combined this new office with the Office of the Special Adviser on the Pre-
vention of Genocide.34 While each office has a distinct mandate, both focus 
on atrocity prevention, and both Special Advisers report directly to the U.N. 
Secretary-General.35 The main task of the Special Adviser on the Responsi-
bility to Protect is to advance “the conceptual, political and institutional de-
velopment and further refinement of the principle.”36 In 2009, the office pub-
lished a report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.37 The 
report introduced a “three-pillar” strategy for implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect, which has served as a framework for debate on the responsibility 
to protect concept.38 Since 2009, the Secretary-General has also addressed the 
responsibility to protect and related issues in annual reports.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
analysis of these situations and the U.N. Security Council’s role in stemming, exacerbating 
or failing to act in each situation). 
 33 Mandate, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/office-mandate.s 
html (last visited Mar. 4, 2020). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
 38 Id. at 3. 
 39 Subsequent reports include Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Pro-
tect (2010); The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect (2011); Timely and Decisive Response (2012); State Responsibil-
ity and Prevention (2013); Fulfilling our Collective Responsibility: International Assis-
tance and the Responsibility to Protect (2014); A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Imple-
menting the Responsibility to Protect (2015); Mobilizing Collective Action: the Next 
Decade of the Responsibility to Protect (2016); Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: 
Accountability for Prevention (2017); Responsibility to Protect: From Early Warning to 
Early Action (2018); and Responsibility to Protect: Lessons Learned for Prevention 
(2019). The United Nations, Secretary-General, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON GENOCIDE 
PREVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, https://www.un.org/en/genocidepreven 
tion/secretary-general.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
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iii. Applying the Responsibility to Protect: 2011 Security Council 
Resolutions on Libya 
 
In the context of the Arab Spring, Libyan activists took to the streets in 
February 2011 to protest against the Libyan government.40 Muammar Ghad-
dafi had controlled the Libyan government since 1969.41 Forces loyal to 
Ghaddafi responded with widespread, violent attacks on civilians.42 On Feb-
ruary 21, 2011, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for an immediate 
end to any attacks on civilians by Libyan authorities.43 The following day, 
U.N. Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Francis Deng and U.N. 
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect Edward Luck issued a joint 
statement, which echoed the Secretary General’s call to halt all violence and 
reminded Libya of its responsibility to protect its populations.44 U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay also called for an immediate end 
to human rights violations against protestors in Libya.45 The Arab League, 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, the African Union, and the U.N. Se-
curity Council followed suit, also condemning Libyan state action.46 On Feb-
ruary 26, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970, 
which recognized the “Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its popu-
lation.”47 The resolution permitted coercive measures, including international 
sanctions, against the Ghaddafi regime, but it did not authorize military inter-
vention into Libya.48 
 
 40 Libya Profile–Timeline, BBC (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-afric 
a-13755445. 
 41 Id.; Deadly ‘Day of Rage’ in Libya, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 18, 2011), https://www.aljazeer 
a.com/news/africa/2011/02/201121716917273192.html. 
 42 Fresh Violence Rages in Libya, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 22, 2011), https://www.aljazeera.c 
om/news/africa/2011/02/201122261251456133.html. 
 43 See Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Outraged Secretary-General Calls for Im-
mediate End to Violence in Libya, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/13408-AFR/2119 (Feb. 22, 
2011), https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13408.doc.htm. 
 44 Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General Special Advisers Francis Deng and Edward 
Luck, Situation in Libya, U.N. Press Release (Feb. 22, 2011), https://reliefweb.int/report/li 
bya/un-secretary-general-special-adviser-prevention-genocide-francis-deng-and-special. 
 45 See Statement from Navi Pillay (U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights) to Fif-
teenth Special Session of Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya (Feb. 25, 2011), https://newsachive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/D 
isplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10760&amp;LangID=E. 
 46 GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AFTER LIBYA & COTE D’IVOIRE,  https://reliefweb.int/sites/rel 
iefweb.int/files/rsources/BACKGROUND_BRIEFING_R2P_AFTER_LIBYA_AND_C 
OTE_DIVOIRE.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 47 S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 9 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
 48 Id. 
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After two weeks of mounting violence against civilians by government 
actors, the U.N. Security Council adopted a second resolution, Resolution 
1973, on March 17, 2011.49 Unlike the first resolution, the Security Council 
did not unanimously adopt the second.50 Ten members of the Security Council 
supported the resolution while five members abstained (Brazil, China, Ger-
many, Russia and South Africa).51 Resolution 1973 authorized “all necessary 
measures including coercive military action but short of a ‘foreign occupation 
force’ to protect civilians and civilian populated areas.”52 On March 19, mili-
tary forces under the command of France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States began intervening in Libya.53 
Debate over the scope and reach of Resolution 1973 began in earnest 
after NATO forces took sole command of the intervention on March 24, 
2011.54 Critical to the responsibility to protect debate was whether the military 
support NATO gave to the Libyan rebels, who fought for regime change and 
the overthrow of Libyan Head-of-State Muammar Gaddafi,55 could be con-
sidered within the scope of Resolution 1973, since the resolution authorized 
force only for the protection of civilians.56 
 
iv. Backing Away from the Responsibility to Protect Concept: Post-
2011 Libya Situation–Present57 
 
While debate has continued on the responsibility to protect, the concept 
has not been used to justify international involvement in individual states 
since the U.N. Security Council authorized military intervention in Libya in 
2011. However, the U.N. Security Council has repeatedly referenced the re-
sponsibility to protect concept in its resolutions, and the Secretary-General 
 
 49 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over 
Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour 
with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1973 (2011). 
 50 GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 46. 
 51 Id. 
 52 S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 53 Andrew Glass, Obama Approves Airstrikes Against Libya, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2019, 
12:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/19/barack-obama-libya-airstrikes-12 
24550. 
 54 Libya Civil War Fast Facts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/libya-civi 
l-war-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Apr. 17, 2019). 
 55 Id. 
 56 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 57 U.N. OFFICE ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
COMPENDIUM OF PRACTICE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 2005–
2016, http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/RtoP%20Compendium%20o 
f%20Practice%20(Provisional%20Pre-Publication%20Version)%20FINAL%2020%20M 
arch%202017.pdf. 
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has continued to issue annual reports on the responsibility to protect.58 In do-
ing so, these entities have contributed to the debate59 and development of R2P. 
While the Libyan intervention stoked debate on the successes and failures 
of the responsibility to protect in action, the Syrian crisis has demonstrated 
the consequences of inaction. The building crisis in Syria erupted shortly after 
the Security Council authorized action in Libya in 2011.60 While the Security 
Council emphasized in five resolutions between February 2014 and December 
2016 that the Syrian regime had a responsibility to protect all people within 
its borders, the Security Council never authorized coercive military action, as 
it did in Libya.61 The Syrian crisis developed into a civil war and one of the 
largest humanitarian crises in recent history, which continues to this day.62  
III. EVOLUTION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT CONCEPT 
The Commission first presented the responsibility to protect concept in 
the 2001 Commission Report.63 Despite varying support for enforcing or act-
ing on the concept since it was introduced, the core premises of the concept 
have remained largely unchallenged since 2001. 
 
A. Core Premises of the Concept 
 
The responsibility to protect rests on two core premises regarding state 
sovereignty. First, an individual state’s responsibility to protect its population 
is implied in state sovereignty.64 Second, the international community has a 
responsibility to protect a population when a state is unwilling or unable to do 
 
 58 U.N. Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Re-
sponsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/69/981-S/2015/500 (July 13, 2015). 
 59 Gareth Evans, Gareth Evans on ‘Responsibility to Protect’ After Libya, WORLD 
TODAY (Oct. 5, 2012), https://www.gevans.org/opeds/oped132.html. 
 60 Syria Profile –Timeline, BBC (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-mid 
dle-east-14703995. 
 61 See S.C. Res. 2139 (Feb. 22, 2014) (demanding Syria protect civilians and stressing 
“the primary responsibility to protect its population lies with the Syrian authorities”); S.C. 
Res. 2165 (July 14, 2014) (“Reaffirming the primary responsibility of the Syrian authorities 
to protect the population in Syria.”); S.C. Res. 2254 (Dec. 15, 2015) (demanding once again 
that all parties to the Syrian conflict protect civilians and stressing “the primary responsi-
bility to protect its population lies with the Syrian authorities”); S.C. Res. 2258 (Dec. 22, 
2015) (reaffirming Syria’s responsibility to protect); S.C. Res. 2332 (Dec. 21, 2016) (reaf-
firming Syria’s responsibility to protect and “reiterating that parties to armed conflict must 
take all feasible steps to protect civilians”). 
 62 Syria Profile–Timeline, supra note 60. 
 63 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at VIII. 
 64 Id. at XI. 
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so.65 The Commission introduced these two premises in its 2001 report, stat-
ing:  
1. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary re-
sponsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state 
itself. 
2. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of 
internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the 
state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the 
principle of non-intervention yields to the international re-
sponsibility to protect.66 
To support the core premises, the Commission relied on theories of in-
ternational law regarding state sovereignty, the U.N. Charter, human 
rights and humanitarian law, as well as the developing practices of states, 
regional organizations, and the U.N. Security Council regarding inter-
vention and state sovereignty.67 Since 2001, the U.N. Secretary-General 
and the U.N. General Assembly have affirmed the two core premises of 
the responsibility to protect.68 
 
i. Primary, Individual Duty of Each State to Protect Persons in Its 
Jurisdiction or Control 
 
At its core, the responsibility to protect concept rests on a global 
consensus that states, as sovereign powers, owe certain obligations to 
their peoples. The Commission held that as international human rights 
developed, this concept of state responsibility crystalized not just 
through state and intergovernmental practice, but also through human 
rights and humanitarian international covenants and treaties.69 Thus, ac-
cording to the Commission, the obligations of sovereignty developed to 
 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 “The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the inter-
national community of states, lie in: obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty; the 
responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the U.N. Charter, for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security; specific legal obligations under human rights 
and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law 
and national law; the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security 
Council itself.” Id. at XI. 
 68 U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005); G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 
World Summit Outcome, ¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
 69 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at XI. 
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require that states not only refrain from harming their peoples, but also 
actively ensure individuals’ rights are upheld.70  
The U.N. General Assembly has recognized and affirmed this core 
premise of the responsibility to protect in two resolutions.71  These reso-
lutions demonstrated that consensus exists in the international commu-
nity regarding the legal norm that states, as sovereign powers, owe cer-
tain obligations to their peoples, including the obligation to protect them 
from atrocities.72  
Paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document states 
in full: 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its pop-
ulations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the pre-
vention of such crimes, including their incitement, through ap-
propriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility 
and will act in accordance with it. The international commu-
nity should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exer-
cise this responsibility and support the United Nations in es-
tablishing an early warning capability.73 
In paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the 
U.N. General Assembly recognized a core, foundational premise of the 
responsibility to protect concept––that states are required to protect pop-
ulations from atrocities, including genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleans-
ing, and crimes against humanity.74 The General Assembly narrowed the 
potential scope of the responsibility to protect concept, but in doing so it 
identified four concrete situations that all states should prevent and react 
to.75  
By passing a General Assembly resolution that embraced the respon-
sibility to protect at the 2005 World Summit, world leaders propelled the 
concept forward; a responsibility to protect from four specific atrocity 
crimes became common ground for the General Assembly and world 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 2005); G.A. Res. 
63/308, The Responsibility to Protect (Oct. 7, 2009). 
 72 G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 2005); G.A. Res. 
63/308, The Responsibility to Protect (Oct. 7, 2009) (recalling the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome and deciding “to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect”). 
 73 G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 138 (Sept. 16, 2005); G.A. Res. 
63/308, The Responsibility to Protect (Oct. 7, 2009). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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leaders to stand on when discussing the concept. Though the World Sum-
mit Outcome was progress for the responsibility to protect, the resolution 
did not make the concept or its discharge legally binding on U.N. mem-
ber states.  
 
ii. Residual, Collective Duty of States to Protect When Individual 
States Fail to Do So 
 
Because sovereign states, which all have the inherent duty to protect their 
populations, form an international community of states through the United 
Nations, this community also has a collective, residual responsibility to pro-
tect the global population.76 The residual responsibility is “activated when a 
particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility 
to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities.”77 Moreo-
ver, this responsibility requires the international community of states to pro-
tect people living outside a particular state who are directly threatened by ac-
tions taking place inside the state.78 As a result, in certain circumstances the 
broader community of states must take action to support populations that are 
in jeopardy or under serious threat. 79  
In its 2001 Report, the Commission asserted “that intervention for human 
protection purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases, is sup-
portable when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently appre-
hended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is 
itself the perpetrator.”80 According to the Commission, multiple concepts sup-
port this premise, including intergovernmental organizational actions,81 natu-
ral law principles, international human rights and humanitarian treaty law,82 
state practice, evolving customary international law, established norms, and 
emerging principles.83 
 
 76 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at ¶ 2.31 (recognizing “the state whose people are directly 
affected has the default responsibility to protect” but the broader community of states has 
the residual responsibility). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at ¶ 2.25. 
 81 Id. (particularly the U.N. Security Council’s actions in Somalia, the Economic Com-
munity of West African States’ interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo). 
 82 Id. (specifically, the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions and Addi-
tional Protocols on international humanitarian law, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court). 
 83 Id. at ¶¶ 2.25–2.27. 
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The General Assembly affirmed the second core premise of the responsi-
bility to protect in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.84 Paragraph 
139 of the Outcome Document states: 
The international community, through the United Nations, also 
has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humani-
tarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters 
VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective ac-
tion, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter 
VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for 
the General Assembly to continue consideration of responsi-
bility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, 
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international 
law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and ap-
propriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their pop-
ulations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under 
stress before crises and conflicts break out.85 
The General Assembly affirmed the responsibility of individual states in par-
agraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome and acknowledged a collective 
responsibility for the “international community” to protect all populations in 
paragraph 139.86 
 
B. Measures by Which the Responsibility to Protect Concept Is to Be 
Discharged 
 
In its 2001 Report, the Commission framed a state’s legal responsi-
bility to protect as a composition of three “elements.” The three “ele-
ments” of the responsibility to protect were summarized as specific “re-
sponsibilities”:  
 
 84 G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 
2005). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root 
causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other 
man-made crises putting populations at risk. 
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of 
compelling human need with appropriate measures, which 
may include coercive measures like sanctions and interna-
tional prosecution, and in extreme cases military interven-
tion. 
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after 
a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, re-
construction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of 
the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.87  
By accepting the individual responsibilities to prevent, react, and rebuild, 
states would fulfill the legal responsibility to protect. The Commission out-
lined measures for how states, either individually or collectively, could dis-
charge the responsibilities of each “element.” These included noncoercive 
measures, coercive measures short of the use of force, and coercive measures 
that include use of armed force. Though neither the U.N. General Assembly 
nor the U.N. Secretary-General adopted the Commission’s framework, dis-
cussing the overarching responsibility to protect in terms of three duties—to 
prevent, to react, to rebuild—has continued.  
 
i. Noncoercive Measures  
 
The 2001 Commission said that for states to discharge their responsibility 
to protect fully, individual states and the international community of states 
must first employ non-coercive prevention measures.88 According to the 
Commission, non-coercive measures include both root cause prevention ef-
forts and direct prevention efforts. 89 Ideally, states would discharge the duty 
to prevent through a well-designed prevention policy.90 According to the 
Commission, such a policy would contain both root cause and direct cause 
prevention efforts.91  
 
 87 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at XI. 
 88 Id. 
 89 The Report noted that “[a]n extensive analysis of the modalities of conflict prevention 
is not the focus of this Commission . . . [b]ut in the context of the Responsibility to Protect, 
improving conflict prevention at every level—conceptually, strategically and operation-
ally—is urgent and essential.” Id. at ¶ 3.9. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at ¶ 3.18. 
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The Commission found support for a “comprehensive and long-term ap-
proach to conflict prevention” in Article 55 of the U.N. Charter, which ad-
dresses international economic and social cooperation.92 The Report expanded 
on the concept of peace and security to include “solutions to international eco-
nomic, social, health and related problems; international, cultural and educa-
tional cooperation; and universal respect for human rights.”93 The Commis-
sion noted the existence of a “growing and widespread recognition that armed 
conflicts cannot be understood without reference to such ‘root’ causes as pov-
erty, political repression, and uneven distribution of resources.”94 The Report 
acknowledged that root cause prevention is multi-faceted and provided exam-
ples of possible political, economic, legal, and military efforts that state, in-
tergovernmental, and nongovernmental actors could employ.95 
Like root cause prevention, direct prevention efforts outlined by the Com-
mission address the same causal areas—political, economic, legal, and mili-
tary—but employ different instruments to prevent a crisis from building.96 Di-
rect prevention measures include “straightforward assistance, positive 
inducements or, in the more difficult cases, the negative form of threatened 
‘punishments.’”97 Depending on the specific situation and effectiveness of the 
non-coercive, direct prevention measures, the Commission recognized that a 
state may have to adopt coercive measures short of military force to keep a 
situation from escalating. Similarly, once a state has determined it is too late 
for prevention efforts to be effective, it must continue to discharge its respon-
sibility to protect by reacting to the situation with coercive measures. 
The U.N. General Assembly and Heads of State embraced the Commis-
sion’s position that the responsibility to protect requires states to prevent 
atrocity crimes through non-coercive measures in the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome.98 In paragraph 138, the General Assembly accepted that each indi-
vidual state has the responsibility to prevent the incitement and occurrence of 
atrocity crimes.99 It also stated the “international community” should “encour-
age and help States exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations 
 
 92 Id.; see also U.N. Charter art. 55. 
 93 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at ¶ 3.18. 
 94 Id. at ¶ 3.19. 
 95 According to the Report, root cause prevention may mean “addressing political needs 
and deficiencies . . . tackling economic deprivation and the lack of economic opportunities 
. . . strengthening legal protections and institutions” and also “embarking upon needed sec-
toral reforms to the military and other state security services” through long-term support 
and reforms. Id. at ¶¶ 3.23–3.24 (emphasis added). 
 96 Id. at ¶¶ 3.23–3.25. 
 97 Id. at ¶ 3.25; see id. at ¶¶ 3.26–3.32 (providing numerous examples of political and 
diplomatic, economic, legal, and military direct prevention measures State and intergov-
ernmental actors could employ). 
 98 G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 
2005). 
 99 Id. at ¶ 138. 
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in establishing an early warning capability.”100 In paragraph 139, the General 
Assembly identified its role in accepting the responsibility to prevent atroci-
ties.101 According to the World Summit Outcome, the General Assembly in-
tended to commit, “as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build ca-
pacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress be-
fore crises and conflicts break out.”102 The General Assembly also expanded 
on the responsibility of the “international community,” stating that this re-
sponsibility required international actors “to use appropriate diplomatic, hu-
manitarian and other peaceful means” through the United Nations in order to 
prevent atrocity crimes.103  
 
ii. Coercive Measures Short of the Use of Armed Force 
 
According to the 2001 Commission, both the responsibility to prevent and 
the responsibility to react to atrocity crimes implicate the use of coercive 
measures.104 In its Report, the Commission stated that states first and foremost 
have the obligation to resolve or contain situations within their domains 
through non-coercive, preventative measures.105 When preventative measures 
fail to curb or resolve a specific situation, states still have the obligation to 
react and redress that situation through coercive measures.106 Only when a 
state is unwilling or unable to redress the situation does the international col-
lective of states have a responsibility to react by protecting that state’s popu-
lation.107 The Commissioners emphasized that “in the case of reaction just as 
with prevention, less intrusive and coercive measures should always be con-
sidered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.”108  
The Commission Report held that to discharge responsibility to protect 
obligations properly, international actors should begin by carefully examining 
and then employing non-military coercive measures.109 The Commission pre-
ferred tailored sanctions. Unlike military interventions, which directly inter-
fere with a domestic authority’s ability to operate in its own territory, political, 
economic, or military sanctions primarily affect a domestic authority’s ability 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at ¶ 139. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 3.33, 4.1. (“The ‘responsibility to protect’ implies 
above all else a responsibility to react to situations of compelling need for human protec-
tion.”). 
 105 Id. at XI. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at ¶ 4.1. 
 109 Id. at ¶¶ 4.3–4.5. 
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to interact with those outside its borders.110 Regardless of the specific meas-
ure, the Commission emphasized that sanctions and all other coercive 
measures short of military force “must be used with extreme care to avoid 
doing more harm than good–especially to the civilian population.”111  
In 2005, the U.N. General Assembly broadly embraced the Commission’s 
position that the responsibility to protect requires states and the “international 
community” to employ coercive measures short of military force when dis-
charging their obligations under responsibility to protect.112 In paragraph 139 
of the World Summit Outcome the General Assembly affirmed that “the in-
ternational community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility 
to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in ac-
cordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against human-
ity.”113 
Since 2005, the U.N. Security Council has referred to the responsibility 
to protect concept in more than eighty of its resolutions.114 The Security Coun-
cil consistently used the concept in resolutions to “reaffirm,” “reiterate,” and 
“recall” that the responsibility to protect civilian populations in crisis situa-
tions lies with individual states.115 Besides publicly condemning state action 
in its resolutions, the Security Council has not imposed coercive measures 
short of military force under the theory of the responsibility to protect.116 
 
iii. Coercive Use of Armed Force 
 
The Commission asserted in its 2001 Report that full discharge of the re-
sponsibility to protect concept could require military action in “extreme and 
exceptional cases.”117 The Commission did emphasize, however, that “[m]ost 
internal political or civil disagreements, even conflicts, within states do not 
require coercive intervention by external powers.”118 The Commission con-
cluded from its year of research that the international community of states and 
civil society generally agreed that circumstances which warrant intervention 
must be “cases of violence which so genuinely ‘shock the conscience of man-
kind,’” or those which “present such a clear and present danger to 
 
 110 Id. at ¶4.4. 
 111 Id. at ¶ 4.5 (noting sanctions, especially blanket economic ones, can be “blunt and 
indiscriminate” if not targeted and appropriately monitored). 
 112 G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 
2005). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Resolutions and Presidential Statements, supra note 29. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at ¶ 4.10. 
 118 Id. at ¶ 4.11. 
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international security,” that they demand military intervention.119 The Com-
mission identified two categories of circumstances that justify intervention: 
§ large scale120 loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal 
intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state ac-
tion, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situa-
tion; or  
§ large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether 
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.121 
The Commission included in its list of threats or occurrences that could qual-
ify for intervention situations caused by a state, as well as those that occur 
where a state has failed or collapsed.122  The Commission Report clarified that 
situations that warrant intervention encompass both “abuses occurring wholly 
within state borders, with no immediate cross-border consequences, and those 
with wider repercussions.”123 The Report also stated that not only the actual 
occurrence of an “extreme and exceptional” situation but also the threat of 
such an occurrence could justify intervention.124 
The Commission identified the U.N. Security Council as the best govern-
ing body to determine cases for intervention.125 The Commission believed the 
Security Council would be particularly valuable when disagreement on 
whether or not to intervene arises on sovereignty grounds, as well as when 
deciding how to mobilize resources effectively.126 In reflecting this view, the 
Commission suggested that “as a matter of practice that all proposals for mil-
itary intervention be formally brought before” the Security Council.127 The 
Commission Report presented two standards for preferred military authoriza-
tion through the Security Council: 
 
 119 Id. at ¶ 4.13. 
 120 The Report “make[s] no attempt quantify ‘large scale’” because the Commission 
doubted determining whether a threat is “large scale” would cause much disagreement in 
practice. Id. at ¶ 4.21. Even so, the Commission did recognize there may be some marginal 
cases where opinions differ, perhaps in situations “where a number of small scale incidents 
may build into large scale atrocity.” Id. 
 121 Id. at ¶ 4.19. 
 122 Id. at ¶ 4.22 (reasoning that when deciding whether a situation justifies intervention, 
“it makes no basic moral difference whether it is state or non-state actors who are putting 
people at risk”). 
 123 Id. at ¶ 4.23 (“This reflects our confidence that, in extreme conscience-shocking cases 
of the kind with which we are concerned, the element of threat to international peace and 
security . . . will be usually found to exist.”). 
 124 Id. at ¶ 4.21 (“Without this possibility of anticipatory action, the international com-
munity would be placed in the morally untenable position of being required to wait until 
genocide begins, before being able to take action to stop it.”). 
 125 THE REPORT, supra note 1, at ¶ 6.14. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at ¶ 6.15. 
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Security Council authorization must in all cases be sought 
prior to any military intervention action being carried out. 
Those calling for an intervention must formally request such 
authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own 
initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 
99 of the UN Charter; and 
The Security Council should deal promptly with any request 
for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large 
scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing; it should in this 
context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the 
ground that might support a military intervention.128 
Though the Commission Report expressly held that the Security Council 
should be the first and primary source of military authorization, the Commis-
sion suggested that the Security Council should not be the last when it fails to 
deal with a proposal for military intervention.129 The Commission considered 
alternative means of discharging the responsibility to protect concept through 
either the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” procedures or 
through regional organizations, citing their authority under Chapter VIII of 
the U.N. Charter.130 
Like the Commission, the U.N. General Assembly also recognized that 
discharging the responsibility to protect could require coercive use of military 
force after peaceful measures fail.131 The responsibility to protect concept, as 
embraced by the General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome can 
require military intervention “should peaceful means be inadequate and na-
tional authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from gen-
ocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”132 Accord-
ing to the General Assembly, only the Security Council can authorize the 
discharge of the international community’s responsibility to protect through 
“timely and decisive” coercive military action.133 The World Summit Out-
come stated that any collective military action must be taken through the Se-
curity Council “in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate.”134  
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at ¶ 6.28. 
 130 Id. at ¶¶ 6.29–6.35. 
 131 G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 
2005). 
 132 Id. at ¶ 139. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
794 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:773 
The U.N. Security Council has discharged the responsibility to protect 
concept through coercive military force one time since the General Assembly 
affirmed the Security Council had authority to do so.135 The U.N. Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1973, on March 17, 2011, after two weeks of 
mounting violence against Libyan civilians, carried out by Libyan authori-
ties.136 The Security Council specifically referred to the responsibility to pro-
tect in the introduction of Resolution 1973.137   
Resolution 1973 authorized all necessary measures including coercive 
military action but short of a “foreign occupation force” to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas.138 The Security Council authorized military in-
tervention, a no-fly zone, an arms embargo, a ban on Libyan flights, and an 
asset freeze.139 Paragraph 4 of the resolution stated that the Security Council: 
Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-
General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-
General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding par-
agraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and ci-
vilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign oc-
cupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and 
requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-
General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the 
authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be im-
mediately reported to the Security Council . . . .140 
On March 19, 2011, forces under the command of France, the United King-
dom, and the United States began a military intervention in Libya.141 NATO 
forces took sole command of military action on March 24.142 The U.N. 
 
 135 S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 136 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approved ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over 
Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour 
with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 
17, 2011). 
 137 S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (recognizing it was “the responsibility of the Libyan 
authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts 
bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civil-
ians”). 
 138 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6, 8. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at ¶ 4. 
 141 Libya Civil War Fast Facts, supra note 54. 
 142 Id. 
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Security Council has not used the responsibility to protect concept to author-
ize coercive, military force since the Libya situation in 2011.143 
 
C. Debate over the Responsibility to Protect Concept 
 
After both the U.N. Secretary-General and U.N. General Assembly 
endorsed the premise that sovereignty implies responsibility in 2005, de-
bate largely shifted from whether the responsibility to protect concept 
had status as international law to the scope and measures by which states 
could discharge their duties to protect. 
 
i. Reframing the Debate: 2009 Report of the Secretary-General Report 
on “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” 
 
In 2009, the U.N. Secretary-General reframed the responsibility to 
protect to reflect the concept as embraced by the General Assembly.144 
In his report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, the Secretary-
General reintroduced the responsibility to protect as a concept resting on 
three “pillars.”145 These pillars were: 
Pillar one: Every state has the responsibility to protect its pop-
ulations from the four mass atrocities.  
Pillar two: The wider international community has the respon-
sibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that 
responsibility.  
Pillar three: If a state is manifestly failing to protect its popu-
lations, the international community must be prepared to take 
appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner 
and in accordance with the U.N. Charter.146 
Similar to the first core premise of the 2001 Commission’s Report and para-
graph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, Pillar one ad-
dressed the responsibility of individual states to protect their populations.147 
Pillar one also affirmed the first core premise of the responsibility to protect 
 
 143 Resolutions and Presidential Statements, supra note 29. 
 144 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id.; THE REPORT, supra note 1, at XI; G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
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concept: that individual states have a responsibility to protect their peoples. 
Pillars two and three of the U.N. Secretary-General’s framework for the re-
sponsibility to protect supported the U.N. General Assembly’s understanding 
of collective responsibility, as embraced in the World Summit Outcome.148 
Pillars two and three also embraced the second core premise of the responsi-
bility to protect concept, identified in both the 2001 Commission Report and 
2005 World Summit Outcome: that the international community of states has 
a residual responsibility to protect a state’s population when it is unwilling or 
unable to do so.149 
 
ii. From Existence to Operation: Determining the Scope of 
Obligations Under the Responsibility to Protect 
 
The 2005 General Assembly resolution solidified the norm that states 
have a collective responsibility to protect the global population. While both 
formal and informal discussions since 2005 have affirmed the existence of the 
responsibility to protect concept, its application is not as simple as its decla-
ration. Though the core premises of the responsibility to protect were affirmed 
on a global stage at the World Summit by the United Nations and world lead-
ers,150 how to discharge the responsibility that the core premises support has 
required its own debate. 
 
iii. Focus on Coercive Military Intervention: Stalling the 
Responsibility to Protect Debate 
 
Discourse on the responsibility to protect concept has largely fo-
cused on the issue of military force. The discharge of responsibility to 
protect obligations through coercive military force is represented by the 
third pillar of the United Nations “three-pillar” framework.151 The third 
pillar holds that “if a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, 
the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collec-
tive action in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the 
U.N. Charter.”152 Since the Security Council cited the responsibility to 
 
 148 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,  U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009); THE REPORT, supra note 1, at XI; G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 
2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
 149 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009); THE REPORT, supra note 1, at XI; G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 
2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
 150 G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 
2005). 
 151 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
 152 Id. 
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protect when authorizing military force during the Libyan situation in 
2011, the focus on coercive military action and debate over whether the 
concept is any different than traditional intervention by states or inter-
governmental organizations for humanitarian purposes has intensified. 
Moreover, critics and opponents alike have analyzed the situations 
in which the Security Council did not discharge the responsibility to pro-
tect duty through coercive military force—such as Syria—and the sole 
situation in which it did in 2011 in Libya. Even many of those who ac-
cepted that the responsibility to protect is distinct from humanitarian in-
tervention have continued to focus on the discharge of the concept’s ob-
ligations through military force.153 Articles and books have debated time 
and time again whether the responsibility to protect could ever succeed 
in preventing or responding to atrocities while the permanent members 
of the Security Council had veto power. Though the responsibility to 
protect rests on three separate pillars, debate has disproportionately fo-
cused on the third.  
IV. REVIVING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT CONCEPT 
While the possibility of military intervention into a sovereign state’s ter-
ritory necessarily requires debate and understanding among all international 
actors, hyper-focusing on one measure for discharging R2P obligations will 
forever stunt the concept’s development. Proponents of the responsibility to 
protect must return to the original purpose of the doctrine and shift focus from 
military intervention to investing in prevention at national, regional, and in-
ternational levels.  
 
A. Recognizing the Current State of the Responsibility to Protect Concept 
 
The responsibility to protect remains a concept of international law, but 
it has slowed in its development. The U.N. General Assembly embraced the 
concept in 2005.154 In 2009, the General Assembly reaffirmed this original 
commitment, but it has been considering155 the concept and the obligations 
R2P imposes on individual states and the United Nations since then. While 
formal and informal debates and reports continue,156 the principle’s 
 
 153 See, e.g., DAN KUWALI, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ARTICLE 4(H) INTERVENTION 36 (2011) (recognizing R2P as a concept while still asserting 
that intervention is “the most realistic means to stop ongoing mass atrocities” in Africa). 
 154 G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 
2005). 
 155 G.A. Res. 63/308, Responsibility to Protect (Oct. 7, 2009). 
 156 See List of Annual Debates/Dialogues, U.N. GEN. ASSEMBLY AT OFFICE FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/general-assembly 
.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2019). 
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development as a legal doctrine has been minimal since the Security Council 
distanced itself from the concept after invoking it to authorize military inter-
vention in Libya.157 
The issue of coercive use of military force in discharging the duties of the 
responsibility to protect has made the concept ineffective in its current state. 
Since 2011, the Security Council has continued to remind states they have a 
responsibility to protect the populations who are suffering at the hands of state 
authorities, but it has not relied on the concept for authorizing significant co-
ercive measures. Words, debates, reports, and resolutions on the concept have 
continued, but action by states to discharge the concept has stalled. 
Further, R2P’s growth as a legal norm before the Security Council dis-
charged it during the Libyan intervention compared to its growth afterwards 
demonstrates that its development into a force for atrocity prevention has 
slowed. The Libyan intervention occurred approximately eight years ago, and 
no legal developments suggest that the concept’s use for atrocity prevention 
in international law has evolved.158 Rather, the aftermath of the Libyan situa-
tion contributed to a stall in the development of the responsibility to protect 
as a tool for prevention, and it also encouraged an explosion of discourse on 
the role of military and humanitarian intervention in the concept.159 
Supporters of the concept who want to see R2P effect change first must 
recognize that while the concept is a doctrine on prevention in theory, in real-
ity the concept is caught in the debate of humanitarian intervention. Second, 
proponents must also commit to refocusing the debate and future development 
of R2P on prevention. The continued occurrence of the world failing to pre-
vent or stem human rights crises, such as in Syria,160 has only renewed focus 
on resolving issues of when, whether, and how the international community 
of states, through the United Nations, can stop these situations.  
 
B. Revisiting the Origins of the Responsibility to Protect: The 2001 
Commission Report 
 
A review of the original text of the responsibility to protect concept while 
considering its development over the past eighteen years, supports the argu-
ment that today’s focus on military intervention is disproportionate to the role 
of intervention in the context of the whole concept. 
 
 
 157 S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 158 Referring to the lack of legal developments beyond the 2005 World Summit Outcome. 
G.A. Res. 39 U.N. Doc. A/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
 159 David Rieft, R2P, R.I.P. N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html. 
 160 Syria Profile–Timeline, supra note 60. 
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i. Remembering the Responsibility to Protect’s Purpose and 
Priorities 
 
In 2001, the Commission was tasked with answering then Secretary-Gen-
eral Kofi Annan’s challenge of how to stop atrocities from occurring around 
the world. The Commission’s response was, in short, prevention.161 The Com-
mission identified the two priorities of the responsibility to protect concept as:  
Prevention is the single most important dimension of respon-
sibility to protect: prevention options should always be ex-
hausted before intervention is contemplated, and more com-
mitment and resources must be devoted to it.  
The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react 
should always involve less intrusive and coercive measures 
being considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are 
applied. 162 
The Commission Report emphasized that the responsibility to protect 
concept, at its core, is focused on preventing atrocities.163 While the Commis-
sion Report addressed the challenges of designing an effective prevention sys-
tem through detailed suggestions for operationalizing the responsibility to 
protect concept at the United Nations, the Commission’s attention towards 
coercive military force does not mean the concept is a repackaged version of 
traditional humanitarian intervention.164  
 
ii. Distinguishing the Responsibility to Protect Concept from 
Humanitarian Intervention 
 
In a 2012 interview on the status of the responsibility to protect after the 
Libyan intervention, Gareth Evans, a Co-Chair of the Commission, empha-
sized that the responsibility to protect concept was not “just old ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ in a new guise.”165 Evans distinguished the two concepts by ex-
plaining that “[the responsibility to protect] is primarily about prevention, 
whereas humanitarian intervention is only about reaction. [The responsibility] 
to protect is about a continuum of responses by a whole range of actors, not 
just those able and willing to apply military force.”166 The Commission’s 
 
 161 THE REPORT, supra note 1. 
 162 Id. at XI. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at ¶¶ 7.1–7.3. 
 165 Evans, supra note 59 (responding “[a]bsolutely not!” to the suggestion). 
 166 Id. 
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Report emphasized that the concept justifies military intervention only after 
prevention fails, and even then, only after non-military coercive measures fail 
too.167 “The responsibility to react—with military coercion—can only be jus-
tified when the responsibility to prevent has been fully discharged.”168 The 
Commission’s conception of R2P did not require international actors to at-
tempt every prevention option, but “there must be reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that, in all the circumstances, if the measure had been attempted it 
would not have succeeded.”169 
Though Libya, as the only situation in which the Security Council 
authorized military action under responsibility to protect,170 demands 
discussion, those engaged in debate must analyze the specific interven-
tion in Libya, as well as the general doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion, in its proper place within the larger framework of the concept. The 
Commission split both state and collective responsibility into three sep-
arate duties: first to prevent, second to react, and third to rebuild.171 By 
refocusing the debate on the first duty of prevention, proponents can de-
velop the concept in a manner that optimizes its potential for systemic 
change. In purposefully centering the discourse on the duty of preven-
tion, opponents must engage with the responsibility to protect as a pre-
vention concept before they can focus on its relation to military interven-
tion. 
 
C. Redirecting the Responsibility to Protect’s Development: From a Form 
of “Humanitarian Intervention” to the Means for “Conflict Prevention” 
 
To revive and improve the concept, all of civil society and states need not 
only refer to the responsibility to protect in the case of reaction measures, but 
also the case of long-term prevention measures. By pushing the concept to the 
individual causes of different actors, proponents of the responsibility to pro-
tect can begin building political will and support for the responsibility to pro-
tect in civil society. To revive the concept, it is critical that the general popu-
lation—rather than just those in the world of international law and 
diplomacy—understand the concept is properly discharged when there is no 
crisis or need to consider intervention. While changes in dialogue or in fram-
ing the responsibility to protect debate may seem trivial compared to enacting 
a resolution for military intervention, the originators of the concept recognized 
 
 167 While military intervention is included in the principle, the Responsibility to Protect 
is “very much concerned with alternatives to military action, including all forms of pre-
ventive measures, and coercive interventions measures—sanctions and criminal prosecu-
tions—falling short of military intervention.” THE REPORT, supra note 1, at ¶ 1.8. 
 168 Id. at ¶ 4.37. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at ¶ 1. 
 171 THE REPORT, supra note 1. 
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the power of words.172 Rather than continue to frame the concepts of atrocity 
prevention and state responsibility as intervention, the Commission developed 
a new term to open the debate and bring more parties to the discussion table.173 
So too must proponents of the responsibility to protect today. As Gareth Ev-
ans, Co-Chair of the Commission, stated:  
The whole point of [the responsibility to protect] doctrine, in 
the minds of those of us who conceived it, was above all to 
change the way that the world’s policymakers, and those who 
influence them, thought and acted in response to emerging, im-
minent and actually occurring mass atrocity crimes. It was to 
generate a reflex international response that genocide, other 
crimes against humanity and major war crimes happening be-
hind sovereign state walls were everybody’s business, not no-
body’s.174 
To generate the political will and institutional capacity necessary for 
making the responsibility to protect effective in international law, the 
conversation must shift not only to prevention but also to why collective 
prevention matters for the world.175 
A focus on prevention requires states and their populations to look for-
ward rather than to react to the current situation. To implement the responsi-
bility to protect requires enormous political will and understanding of how to 
best implement existing preventative options—not only at the international 
level but also the domestic level.176 The 2001 Commission Report asserted 
that governmental and intergovernmental organizations do not lack the basic 
data required for early warning; rather, they lack timely analysis and transla-
tion into prevention policy efforts.177 The Commission Report also suggested 
that early warning for deadly conflict was usually after-the-fact and unstruc-
tured, and more official resources devoted to early warning and analysis were 
 
 172 Id. at ¶ 2.4. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Case Summary of Uses of the Responsibility to Protect, GLOB. CTR. FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.globalresponsibilitytoprotect.org/media/files/ca 
se-summary-final-e-version.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2018). 
 175 The Commission pointed to globalization and the ripple effect one state’s domestic 
affairs can have on neighboring, regional, and international states in the 21st century. THE 
REPORT, supra note 1, at ¶ 3.3 (“[C]onflict prevention is not merely a national or local 
affair.”). 
 176 Id. at ¶ 3.2 (treating all citizens fairly, promoting social and economic development, 
protecting human rights, and ensuring accountability and good governance at the national 
level provides the foundation and means for conflict prevention). 
 177 Id. at ¶ 3.10 (“[L]ack of early warning is an excuse rather than an explanation, and the 
problem is not lack of warning but of timely response.”). 
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needed.178 Since the Commission published its Report in 2001, the U.N. Sec-
retary-General appointed a Special Adviser for the Responsibility to Protect; 
her office focuses on developing prevention tactics.179 As the Commission 
Report noted, the responsibility to protect relies not only on states to play their 
role, but on civil society at all levels: whether local, state, regional or interna-
tional.180 To mobilize the responsibility to protect, all must play a role in shift-
ing the current culture from that of reaction to a “culture of prevention.”181 
V. CONCLUSION 
The responsibility to protect as a legal concept that can effect change in 
the world has stalled. To realize R2P’s goal of atrocity prevention, proponents 
of the concept must change the discourse and direction of the concept. To 
revive and improve the concept, proponents must also recognize the stagnant 
state it currently occupies in international law; revisit the core principles of 
the concept in order to refocus the debate; and redirect efforts across state and 
civil society to develop the principle, not as a concept of international human-
itarian intervention, but as a concept of conflict prevention. Though the de-
velopment of the concept has slowed in international law, by redirecting focus 
from the concept as a means of humanitarian intervention to a legal concept 
with force for conflict prevention, proponents can revive the responsibility to 
protect and better achieve its goal of atrocity prevention. 
 
 
 178 Id. at ¶¶ 3.10–3.11 (citing the need for the U.N. to develop its early warning capabil-
ities and the crucial need for regional actors to become more involved). 
 179 Id. at ¶¶ 3.30–3.40. 
 180 Id. at ¶¶ 3.42–3.43 (stating all must “be ready to act in the cause of prevention and not 
just in the aftermath of disaster”). 
 181 Mandate, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/office-mandate.s 
html (last visited Jan. 10, 2019). 
